Understanding the cognitive underpinnings of moral judgment is one of most pressing problems in psychological science. Classic studies suggest that intuition decreases utilitarian (expected welfare maximizing) judgments in sacrificial moral dilemmas, in which one has to decide whether to instrumentally harm (IH) one person to save a greater number of people. However, recent work suggests that such dilemmas are not fit for purpose as they fail to capture the defining core of utilitarianism, that is, commitment to impartial beneficence (IB). Accordingly, a new, two-dimensional model of utilitarian judgment has been proposed that distinguishes IH and IB. The role of intuition on this new model has not been studied. Does intuition disfavor utilitarian choices only along the dimension of instrumental harm or does it also do so along the dimension of impartial beneficence? To answer this question, we conducted three studies (total N = 970, two preregistered) using conceptual priming of intuition versus deliberation on moral judgments. Our evidence converges on an interaction effect, with intuition decreasing utilitarian judgments in IH-as suggested by previous work-but failing to do so in IB. These findings provide additional support to the recently proposed two-dimensional model of utilitarian moral judgment among ordinary people, and open up new avenues for future research.
Introduction
Understanding how ordinary people make decisions within the moral domain is of profound importance both theoretically and practically. Theoretically, it is important because much of human psychology is concerned with making moral judgments; if we want to understand how the mind works, then, moral considerations must play a large role. Practically, it is important because we are all affected by the moral decisions of those around us, often in serious ways: effective public policy, for instance, will therefore depend on a keen appreciation of how the moral psychology of ordinary people actually works. In the current literature, attempts to describe and explain this psychology have been dominated by what have come to be called 'sacrificial' moral dilemmas.
These refer to-usually hypothetical-situations in which a person must decide whether to endorse an action that is expected to maximize welfare (e.g., save the most number of lives) while foreseeably causing the death of at least one innocent person, often instrumentally. For example, is it morally permissible to torture an innocent person to death if this would be necessary to prevent a major terrorist attack that would kill hundreds of people? Most people recognize that there is a tension between two competing moral positions in such cases, but different people may resolve this tension differently. In the terrorist example, those who endorse torturing the innocent person to prevent hundreds of deaths are typically said to be making a 'consequentialist' judgment, because such an action appears to be consistent with what is required by moral theories according to which the rightness or wrongness of an action depends only on its consequences. A particularly famous consequentialist theory is act utilitarianism, which holds, more specifically, that "actions are right in proportion as they tend to promote happiness, wrong as they tend to produce the reverse of happiness" (Mill, 1863 ; see also Bentham 1789 Bentham /1983 . In line with the focus of most other work in moral psychology, we will concern ourselves only with act utilitarianism in this paper, setting aside other consequentialist theories (i.e., those holding that the moral status of an action depends on consequences other than happiness or well-being).
There are many ways to reject utilitarianism-for example, one might be inclined toward Aristotelian virtue ethics, or a feminist ethics of care-but the main non-utilitarian moral theory discussed in the contemporary moral psychology literature is 'deontology.' Broadly speaking, a deontological moral theory holds that the rightness or wrongness of an action depends on whether it fulfils certain moral norms, rules, or duties, regardless of the consequences (e.g. Kant, 1797 Kant, /2002 . Because deontology is usually treated as the main, or perhaps the only, alternative to utilitarianism, people who decline to endorse the ostensibly utilitarian option in a sacrificial moral dilemma are often said to have made a 'deontological' judgment (Greene, 2015) So, for example, if someone declines to endorse the torturing of an innocent person, despite the fact that this has been stipulated to lead to the deaths of hundreds of other innocent people, it is typically assumed that their motivation or reasoning must be based in deontological considerations. For example, a Kantian prohibition on using other people as a mere means to an ends, or perhaps more simply, an intuitive application of the commonsense moral rule that killing innocent people is wrong (even if it will have good consequences).
According to now classic work in moral psychology (beginning with Greene, Sommerville, Nystrom, Darley & Cohen, 2001) , tendencies to favour 'utilitarian' or 'deontological' resolutions to sacrificial moral dilemmas may reflect two distinct and dissociable, underlying cognitive processes in the psychology of ordinary people, characterized by Greene (2008) as psychological natural kinds. According to this view, utilitarian tendencies and deontological tendencies map onto even more basic cognitive systems that operate quite differently. One system (System 1) is said to be fast, intuitive, and primarily affective, whereas the other system (System 2) is said to be slow, deliberative, and rational (Chaiken & Trope, 1999; Epstein, 1994; Evans & Stanovich, 2013; Kahneman, 2011; Sloman, 1996 ; but see Melnikoff & Bargh, 2018) .
Such dual-process theories have successfully modelled people's behaviour in a number of contexts, including problem solving (Fetterman & Robinson, 2013) , consumer behavior (Shiv & Fedorikhin, 1999) , person perception (Tamir, Thornton, Contreras, & Mitchell, 2016) , cooperative behaviour (Rand, Greene & Nowak, 2012) , altruistic behaviour , honest behaviour (Capraro, 2017) , and, indeed, moral judgments in sacrificial dilemmas. According to Greene's influential dual process model, 'deontological' judgments (refusing to sacrifice the one innocent person) are based in immediate intuition and emotional gut-reactions, whereas 'utilitarian' judgments (sacrificing the innocent person to save a greater number) are uniquely attributable to effortful reasoning.
There is now a large body of evidence supporting the view that deliberation tends to result in 'utilitarian' judgments while intuition tends to result in 'deontological' judgments. (Ciaramelli, Muccioli, Ladavas & di Pellegrino, 2007; Conway & Gawronski, 2013; Cummins & Cummins, 2012; Koenigs et al, 2007; Kvaran, Nichols & Sanfey, 2013; Greene et al, 2001; Greene et al, 2008; Li, Xia, Wu & Chen, 2018; Mendez, Anderson, & Shapria, 2005; Patil et al, 2018; Spears, Fernández-Linsenbarth, Okan, Ruz & González, 2018; Suter & Hertwig, 2011; Timmons & Byrne, 2018 Trémolière & Bonnefon, 2014 Trémolière, De Neys & Bonnefon, 2012) . For example, participants typically take longer to make pro-sacrifice (utilitarian) decisions, which is thought to reflect greater cognitive effort (Greene et al., 2001) , whereas forcing participants to respond quickly under time pressure (Suter & Hertwig, 2011; Trémolière & Bonnefon, 2014) , or increasing cognitive load (Trémolière & Bonnefon, 2014) tends to reduce the incidence of such decisions. Based upon these and similar findings, Greene and colleagues have proposed that utilitarian psychological tendencies-and even normative utilitarian philosophical theories-are rooted in higher-level, deliberative mental processes corresponding to superior moral judgment, whereas deontological psychological tendencies and associated moral theories are rooted in lower-level, emotionally-driven mental processes corresponding to unreflective, intuitive, 'gut' feelings (for extensive criticism of this view, see Berker, 2009 ).
In recent years, Kahane and colleagues (Kahane, 2015; Kahane et al, 2015; Kahane et al, 2018; Kahane & Shackel, 2010) have challenged the dual process model on the grounds that previous research has focused entirely on sacrificial dilemmas. According to these critics, sacrificial dilemmas are limited in that they focus on just one dimension of utilitarianism, the morality of causing instrumental harm (IH), while they fail entirely to capture a second, more fundamental dimension of utilitarianism, namely, a commitment to impartial beneficence (IB). This refers to the moral requirement that one must strive to promote the greater good of all human beings (or even all sentient life) in a radically impartial way, that is, without regard to the physical, emotional, or relational distance between the actor and the beneficiary (Singer, 1979) .
Motivated by this perspective, Kahane, Everett et al. (2018) introduced a twodimensional model of utilitarian psychology with both IH and IB components. To measure people's position in this two-dimensional space, Kahane and colleagues introduced, refined, and validated a new scale: the "Oxford Utilitarianism Scale" (OUS). This scale consists of nine short statements or scenarios, five in the dimension of impartial beneficence (IB) and four in the dimension of instrumental harm (IH). Kahane and colleagues found that these two dimensions are psychometrically independent, suggesting that IB and IH are dissociable not just conceptually but also psychologically (but see Conway et al, 2018) . For example, empathic concern (Davies, 1980) , identification with all of humanity (McFarland, Webb & Brown, 2012) , and concern for future generations were found to be positively associated with IB but negatively associated with IH. Moreover, IH was correlated with subclinical psychopathy (Levenson, Kiehl, &Fitzpatrick, 1995) , whereas IB was correlated with religiosity (Huber & Huber, 2012) . Thus, these two dimensions have different individual correlates, and indeed have different secondorder effects on social judgment. A number of studies have now reported that in the domain of IH, non-utilitarian agents are consistently rated as more moral and trustworthy than utilitarian agents (Bostyn & Roets, 2017; Brown & Sacco, 2017; Kreps & Monin, 2014; Everett, Pizarro & Crockett, 2016; Lee, Sul & Kim, in press; Rom, Weiss & Conway, 2017; Rom & Conway, 2018; Sacco et al, 2016; Uhlmann, Zhu & Tannenbaum, 2013) . This is not the case, however, for IB: Everett et al. (2018) have found that non-utilitarian agents tend to be preferred to utilitarian ones only for close interpersonal relationships (e.g., friend, spouse), but not for more distant roles (e.g., political leader).
The emerging picture seems to be that utilitarian decisional tendencies among everyday people do not constitue a single psychological dimension driven by deliberation (in contrast to deontological decisional tendencies, driven by intuition). Rather, such tendencies appear to be themselves divided into two, even more basic psychological dimensions, namely, a relative willingness to endorse-or a lack of aversion to-causing instrumental harm (IH), and a relative commitment to impartial beneficence (IB). If intuitive, System 1 mental processing is thought to disfavor utilitarian judgment-as prior research strongly suggests-we must therefore ask, Along which dimension? Does it do so just along IH, consistent with the focus of the sacrificial dilemmas current predominating this area of research? Or does it do so also along IB, which has only recently been identified as a distinct psychological component of utilitarian thinking?
In this paper we investigate this question, conducting three studies (total N = 970, two preregistered) in which we manipulate participants' cognitive process through conceptual priming of intuition (Shenhav, Rand & Greene, 2011; Rand, Greene, Nowak, 2012; Levine et al, 2018) and look at the effects of participants' rated endorsement of IH and IB on the Oxford Utilitarianism Scale. This is novel in two key ways. First and foremost, it is the first study of its kind to address the cognitive underpinnings of impartial beneficence. Impartial beneficence appears to be a fundamental dimension of utilitarian psychology, and studying cognitive processes underling both instrumental harm and impartial beneficence is necessary to come to a more complete understanding of utilitarian psychology generally. Second, even within the domain of instrumental harm, which has been extensively studied in previous work, our method allows for a better test of the claims of the dual-process model by relying on short items from the OUS that have been extensively validated, instead of the less-validated sacrificial dilemmas. If the effect on IH can be conceptually replicated using these short, validated items, this allows us to have greater confidence in the claims of the dual-process model regarding the IH component of utilitarian psychology.
A final contribution of this work is that it assesses, for the first time, the susceptibility of the OUS to priming; since this was introduced as a trait-level measure of individual differences in proto-utilitarian psychological tendencies, it is important to determine whether or to what extent participants' responses to the short items can be influenced by explicit instructions to rely on intuition versus deliberation.
Study 1
Our first experiment was a non-preregistered exploratory study looking at the effect of priming intuition versus deliberation on participants' scores on the OUS. In this and in the other studies, we report all measures, manipulations and exclusions.
Method
Participants were recruited on Amazon MTurk and paid $0.50 for participating. After eliminating duplicate IP addresses and MTurk IDs (10 observations) and/or individuals who left the OUS incomplete (1 observation), we had a final sample of 263 participants (47% females; mean age = 36.9, SD = 12.2). In the study, participants were randomly assigned to one of two betweensubjects conditions (intuition vs. deliberation). Following Levine et al. (2018) , Study 3, participants were encouraged to use their intuitive (resp. deliberative) system through a conceptual prime making salient how emotion (resp., reason) leads to "good decision making" and "satisfying decisions." Our dependent measure was the Oxford Utilitarianism Scale (OUS), consisting of 9 items in two sub-scales to which participants indicated their agreement on a 7-point scale (1 = strongly disagree, 7 = strongly agree). The first subscale -Impartial Beneficence (OUS-IB) -consists of 5 items reflecting endorsement of the impartial maximization of the greater good, even at the cost of personal self-sacrifice (e.g., "If the only way to save another person's life during an emergency is to sacrifice one's own leg, then one is morally required to make this sacrifice"). The second subscale -Instrumental Harm (OUS-IH) -consists of 4 items reflecting a relative willingness to cause harm in order to bring about the greater good (e.g., "It is morally right to harm an innocent person if harming them is a necessary means to helping several other innocent people"). Mean scores on both dimensions were computed for all participants, and showed good reliability (Cronbach's a = 0.781 in the intuition condition, and 0.783 in the reason condition for OUS-IB; a = 0.726 in the intuition condition, and 0.826 in the reason condition for OUS-IH). When completing these questions, participants were reminded to "rely on emotion [reason] ." Exact experimental instructions are reported in the Appendix.
Conceptual priming of intuition in
To analyze results, we used linear regression, entering conceptual prime condition as a between-subjects factor (0 = intuition, 1 = deliberation) and dummy-coding scores on each OUS dimension as a within-subjects variable (0 = IH; 1 = IB)
Results
We observed a significant interaction of prime and scores on each dimension, B = 0.851, z = 3.99, p < .001, suggesting that conceptual priming had a different impact on the two dimensions of utilitarian psychology. Breaking the interaction down by looking at each dimension separately, we replicated previous work by showing that endorsement of instrumental harm was significantly higher, t = 4.081, p <. 001, when deliberation was primed (M = 4.27, SD = 1.76) than when intuition was primed (M = 3.54, SD = 1.18). In contrast, there was no difference, t = -0.682, p = 0.494, in endorsement of impartial beneficence depending on whether deliberation (M = 4.02, SD = 1.44) or intuition was primed (M = 4.14, SD = 1.41) (see Figure 1) .
Figure 1. Priming intuition decreases utilitarian judgments in the domain of instrumental harm, but not impartial beneficence. Error bars represent 95% confidence intervals. (Study 1).

Discussion
Our first study provides initial evidence that promoting intuition decreases utilitarian judgments in the domain of instrumental harm but not in the domain of impartial beneficence. To see whether this exploratory result could be replicated, we conducted a second study.
Study 2
The goal of the second study was to replicate the finding from Study 1with a pre-registered design, adjusting the priming materials to more closely align with our research questions. In our context, we are not really interested in "emotionally satisfying" versus "rationally satisfying" decisions. Rather, we are interested in what people perceive to be the right thing to do. Therefore, we decided to replace, in the original primes from Levine et al. (2018) that we used in Study 1, the words "emotionally [rationally] satisfying decisions" with "better decisions," and to add one sentence that more explicitly refers to the rightness of using the positively primed cognitive system. Additionally, we decided to use the word "intuition" instead of the word "emotion," given that previous work has focused not just on the importance of emotions to nonutilitarian judgments, but also the role of intuitions more generally.
Method
Participants were recruited on Amazon MTurk and paid $0.50 for participating. After eliminating duplicate IP addresses and MTurk IDs (4 observations) and/or individuals who left the OUS incomplete (0 observations), we had a final sample of 246 participants (43% females; mean age = 33.8, SD = 9.9). None of these participants had participated in the previous study.
The design was identical to Study 1, except for the conceptual primes, which in this case were as follows:
Conceptual priming of intuition in Study 2
Sometimes people make decisions by using feeling and relying on their intuitions. Other times, they make decisions by using logic and relying on their reason.
Many people believe that intuition leads to good decision-making: whether something 'feels right' is often a good indication of whether it is right. When we rely on our automatic 'gut feelings', instead of just logic, we often make better decisions.
Please answer the following nine questions by relying on your intuitions, rather than reason. When you read each question, focus on your first, emotional response and your 'gut-feeling'. Try not to think too much about each question, and instead just focus on what your intuition tells you.
Conceptual priming of deliberation in Study 2
Sometimes people make decisions by using logic and relying on their reason. Other times, they make decisions by using feeling and relying on their intuitions.
Many people believe that reason leads to good decision-making: whether something is rational and makes logical sense is often a good indication of whether it is right. When we think carefully through a problem, rather than just going on automatic 'gut-feelings', we often make better decisions.
Please answer the following nine questions by relying on reason, rather than intuition. When you read each question, focus on thinking and reasoning about the question. Try not to focus on what your emotional gut-reactions tell you, and instead think carefully about each question.
The dependent variables were the same as in Study 1. The design, analysis, exclusion criteria, and sample size were pre-registered at: https://aspredicted.org/gr68s.pdf.
Results
We observed a marginally significant interaction of prime and scores on each dimension, B = 0.337, z = 1.78, p = 0.076), suggesting that conceptual priming had a different impact on the two dimensions of utilitarian psychology. Breaking the interaction down by looking at each dimension separately, we replicated Study 1 by showing that endorsement of instrumental harm was significantly higher, t = 2.583, p = 0.012, when deliberation was primed (M = 4.45, SD = 1.37) than when intuition was primed (M = 4.00, SD = 1.47). Also consistent with Study 1, there was no difference, t = 0.697, p = 0.487, in endorsement of impartial beneficence depending on whether deliberation (M = 4.23, SD = 1.35) or intuition was primed (M = 4.36, SD = 1.37) (see Figure 2 ).
Figure 2. Priming intuition decreases utilitarian judgments in the domain of instrumental harm, but not impartial beneficence. Error bars represent 95% confidence intervals. (Study 2).
Discussion
The results of Study 2 replicated those of Study 1, albeit with slightly different priming materials designed to more closely bear on the research question. The predicted interaction effect in this case, in contrast to Study 1, was only marginally significant by conventional standards, however (p = .076). Therefore, we decided to conduct a third study, with the goal of addressing some of the potential shortcomings of Study 2.
Study 3
We could see three possible limitations to Study 2: perhaps we did not have enough statistical power; perhaps we used a too long a conceptual priming passage, which may have caused some participants to lose interest; and perhaps the word "intuition" was less evocative than the word "emotion." Therefore, in Study 3, we collected a larger sample size and used a conceptual prime that combined the relevant features from Study 1 and Study 2. Specifically, as in Study 1, the priming passages in Study 3 were very short and used the word "emotion" instead of the word "intuition." But as in Study 2, the priming material in Study 3 does not use the words "emotionally [rationally] satisfying decisions," but rather, "better decisions."
Method
Participants were recruited on Amazon MTurk and paid $0.50 for participating. After eliminating duplicate IP addresses and MTurk IDs (6 observations) and/or individuals who left the OUS incomplete (1 observation), we had a final sample of 461 participants (40% females; mean age = 35.6, SD = 10.1). None of these participants had participated in the previous studies. We note that the elimination from the analysis of participants who left the OUS incomplete was not preregistered. Yet, results remain the same if we include in the analysis the one participant who left the OUS incomplete.
The design was identical to Study 1, except for the slight differences to the conceptual primes, which were in this case as follows:
Conceptual priming of intuition in Study 3
Sometimes people make decisions by using feeling and relying on their emotion. Other times, people make decisions by using logic and relying on their reason. The variables were analogous to those of the previous studies. The design, analysis, exclusion criteria, and sample size were pre-registered at: https://aspredicted.org/9hv38.pdf.
Results
We observed a significant interaction of prime and scores on each dimension, B = 0.475, z = 3.53, p < .001), suggesting that conceptual priming had a different impact on the two dimensions of utilitarian psychology. Breaking the interaction down by looking at each dimension separately, we replicated Study 1 by showing that endorsement of instrumental harm was significantly higher, t = 3.288, p = 0.001, when deliberation was primed (M = 4.28, SD = 1.56 than when intuition was primed (M = 3.82, SD = 1.47). In contrast, there was no difference, t = -0.064, p = 0.949, in endorsement of impartial beneficence depending on whether deliberation (M = 4.28, SD = 1.50) or intuition was primed (M = 4.29, SD = 1.38) (see Figure 3) . 
Discussion
In this final replication, we found stronger results consistent with Study 1. Across all three studies, we observed the same pattern of results, suggesting that the basic effect is real and reliable.
General Discussion
In the last two decades, much work in moral psychology has applied dual process models to the study of ostensibly utilitarian judgments in sacrificial moral dilemmas, concluding that nonutilitarian or 'deontological' judgments (refusing to sacrifice the one) are based in immediate intuitions and emotional gut-reactions, whereas utilitarian judgments (sacrificing one to save a greater number) are attributable more to effortful reasoning (Ciaramelli et al, 2007; Koenigs et al, 2007; Greene et al, 2001; Greene et al, 2008; Mendez et al, 2005; Suter & Hertwig, 2011 Trémolière & Bonnefon, 2014 Trémolière et al, 2012) . In recent years, however, this work has been challenged by Kahane, Everett, and colleagues (2018) who argued that proto-utilitarian decision making breaks down into a two-dimensional psychological space, and that solely studying sacrificial dilemmas will not tell us much about utilitarian psychology generally (see also Kahane, 2015; Kahane & Shackel, 2010) .
In particular, the two-dimensional model of utilitarian psychology posits that there are at least two dimensions to consider -impartial beneficence (IB) and instrumental harm (IH) -and that these two dimensions are not just dissociable theoretically, but also empirically. These two dimensions have distinct psychological correlates (Kahane et al , 2018 and even have divergent second-order effects on social perception . Based on a large body of work looking at the effects of intuition and deliberation on sacrificial decisions relating to instrumental harm, researchers have sought to draw conclusions about the nature of utilitarian psychology more generally. What about the second, more fundamental, dimension of utilitarianism -impartial beneficence? In this study we investigated the role of more deliberative or intuitive processes in encouraging utilitarian decisions in both the 'positive' and 'negative' domains of utilitarianism.
We conducted three studies (total N = 970, two preregistered) in which we used conceptual priming to encourage participants to rely on intuition or deliberation when answering nine moral questions tapping the endorsement of IB or IH (the 'Oxford Utilitarianism Scale'). In the domain of instrumental harm, we conceptually replicated previous findings by showing that priming intuition reduces utilitarian decisions about harming for the greater good. In doing so, we demonstrate a causal link between intuition and decreased utilitarian judgments in sacrificial dilemmas using a different cognitive manipulation and different dependent measures from those used in previous studies.
When it comes to the second, more fundamental dimension of utilitarianism -impartial beneficence -however, a different pattern was observed. Across the three studies, our results suggest that, while priming intuition does decrease utilitarian judgment in the dimension of instrumental harm, it does not do so for utilitarian decisions relating to impartial beneficence (e.g. whether someone agrees that if the only way to save another person's life during an emergency is to sacrifice one's own leg, then one is morally required to make this sacrifice). This suggests that these dimensions are not only psychologically distinct in terms of trait measurement, as suggested by Kahane et al. (2018) , but distinct in terms of cognitive processing: conceptual priming of intuition selectively interferes with the IH dimension, but not with the IB dimension. Rather than intuition leading to non-utilitarian decisions in general, intuition seems to favour a refusal to inflict harm for the greater good specifically.
In sum, our results show that conceptual priming of intuition decreases instrumental harm, but not impartial beneficience, further emphasizing the need to study these dimensions of utilitarian psychology separately, rather than assuming that utilitarian judgment can be understood entirely in terms of the psychological states and processes associated with greater willingness to cause instrumental harm.
